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Regan: Tonack v. Montana Bank

NOTES

TONACK V. MONTANA BANK: PREEMPTION,
INTERPRETATION, AND OLDER EMPLOYEES
UNDER MONTANA'S WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
FROM EMPLOYMENT ACT
M. Scott Regan
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1987, the Montana Legislature enacted the Wrongful
Discharge From Employment Act (WDFEA) primarily as a response to two forces: First, employers and insurance companies
sought to "reduce the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow" in
order to eliminate unreasonably large wrongful discharge awards
and marginal wrongful discharge claims.' Second, due to the
Montana Supreme Court's unpredictable interpretation of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the drafters of
WDFEA sought to provide certainty to employment discharge
law in Montana.2
To effectuate its objective of reducing wrongful discharge
claims and awards, the legislature made the WDFEA the exclu-

1. Summary of H.B. 241, 50th Mont. Leg. (Mar. 10, 1987); Statement of Legislative Intent Concerning the Damage Limitation Contained in Section (5) of H.B.
241, Senate Judiciary Comm., 50th Mont. Leg. (Mar. 10, 1987) [hereinafter Legislative Intent]; Montana State Senate Judiciary Comm. Minutes of the Meeting, 50th
Mont. Leg. (Mar. 10, 1987) (statement of Rep. Spaeth); LeRoy H. Schramm, Montana
Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act: A New
Order Begins, 51 MoNT. L. REV. 94, 108-09 (1990); Telephone Interview with LeRoy
Schramm, Chief Legal Counsel for the Montana University System (Oct. 13, 1994).
2. See Leonard Bierman & Stuart A. Youngblood, Interpreting Montana's
Pathbreaking Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 53
MONT. L. REV. 53, 56 (1992); Schramm, supra note 1, at 106-09.
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sive remedy for wrongful discharge3 and capped the amount
recoverable for a wrongful discharge at four years of lost wages
and fringe benefits.4 The drafters of the WDFEA intended the
four-year damage limitation to represent a reasonable compromise between the competing interests of the employer and the
discharged employee.5 That compromise was to protect employers from unreasonably large damage awards and adequately
compensate discharged employees during their search for new
employment. Further, in order to ensure that the WDFEA provides the exclusive remedy for wrongful discharge, the legislature created a preemption provision. The preemption provision
prevents discharge claimants from pursuing a WDFEA remedy
when another state or federal statute provides a remedy or procedure for contesting the dispute.6
Prior to the recent case of Tonack v. Montana Bank,7 Montana courts inconsistently applied the preemption provision,8
and employers and employees did not yet know how the fouryear damage limitation would affect wrongfully discharged employees.9 In Tonack, the Montana Supreme Court provided a
procedure for courts to follow when plaintiffs file concurrent
claims under the WDFEA and another state or federal statute.
Moreover, the holding in Tonack illustrated a fear shared by
many drafters of the WDFEA-that the four-year damage limitation of the WDFEA does not represent a reasonable compromise
between the competing interests of the employer and the
wrongfully discharged older employee.
This Note discusses the Tonack court's interpretation of the
preemption provision and how that decision and the four-year
damage limitation affect wrongfully discharged older employees.
Part II of this Note discusses the historical and legislative background of the WDFEA and preemption provision. Part III describes Tonack's facts, procedure, and holding. Part IV analyzes
the holding of Tonack and how the preemption provision of the
WDFEA might be interpreted in the future. Lastly, Part V concludes by suggesting that the WDFEA does not provide a reason-

3. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-902 (1993).
4. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(1) (1993).
5. See Legislative Intent, supra note 1.
6. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912(1) (1993).
7.
258 Mont. 247, 854 P.2d 326 (1993).
8. Compare Vance v. ANR Freight Systems, Inc., 9 Mont. Fed. Rpts. 36 (D.
Mont. 1991); Higgins v. Food Servs. of Am., 9 Mont. Fed. Rpts. 529 (D. Mont. 1991)
with Deeds v. Decker Coal Co., 246 Mont. 220, 805 P.2d 1270 (1990).
9. See infra part V.
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able compromise for wrongfully discharged older employees and
calls for legislative reform.
II. HISTORY
A. Enactment of the WDFEA
The Montana Legislature enacted the WDFEA partially in
response to the Montana Supreme Court's unpredictable interpretation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'0 The WDFEA was enacted to provide certainty to employers and employees by specifically delineating the elements of a
wrongful discharge.11
The WDFEA provides that a discharge is wrongful if it was
not for good cause or in retaliation for an employee's refusal to
violate public policy."2 The WDFEA also codified the principle
that a discharge is wrongful if it violates the express provisions
of the employer's written personnel policies. 3 In adopting the
written personnel policy provision, the Montana Legislature
sought to discourage wrongful termination suits "by establishing
clear policies and guidelines for employment and discharge." 4
Employee actions for wrongful discharge based on an employer's
violation of written personnel policies were carried over from the
common law in Nye v. Department of Livestock.15 In Nye, the
Montana Supreme Court held that an employer's violation of
written personnel policies may provide a basis for a wrongful
termination claim. 6 Prior to the enactment of the WDFEA,
the court in Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co. 7 allowed a
plaintiff to recover for an employment termination in violation of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'" In Gates,
the Montana Supreme Court applied the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing to written personnel policies and stated:

10. See Schramm, supra note 1, at 95, 108.
11. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(1) (1993); Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 238
Mont. 21, 51, 776 P.2d 488, 506 (1989); Bierman & Youngblood, supra note 2, at 56.
12. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)-(2) (1993).
13. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(3) (1993).
14. Rationale of Proposed Amends. to H.B. 241, Senate Judiciary Comm., Proposed Amend. No. 7, First Reading, 50th Mont. Leg., at 3 (Mar. 10, 1987). This was
the purpose of the provision, at least according to the ad hoc committee.
15. 196 Mont. 222, 639 P.2d 498 (1982); see also Schramm, supra note 1, at
109-10.
16. Nye, 196 Mont. at 228, 639 P.2d at 502.
17. 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982).
18. Id. at 184, 638 P.2d at 1067.
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The employer later promulgated a handbook of personnel policies establishing certain procedures with regard to terminations.... The employee, having faith she would be treated
fairly, then developed a peace of mind associated with job security. If the employer has failed to follow its own policies, the
peace of mind of its employee is shattered and injustice is
done. "9

The court applied the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
"upon objective manifestations by the employer giving rise to the
employee's reasonable belief that he or she has job security and
will be treated fairly."20 Therefore, an employee had a cause of
action when her reasonable expectations of job security or fair
treatment were violated. Often, the employee's expectations were
based on the employer's written personnel policies.
After Gates, the Montana Supreme Court expanded the
scope of remedies and persons protected under the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.2 Then, beginning in 1985, the court
began to "refine" and "moderate" its former decisions premised
on the holding in Gates. The court's expansion and contraction of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing created unpredictability in the employment discharge law in Montana.2 2 This unpredictability, coupled with what employers perceived as unreasonably large awards to wrongful discharge claimants, led Montana
employers and insurance companies (who paid the employment
discharge awards) to seek legislative reform.' The Montana
Legislature responded with the WDFEA. By enacting the
WDFEA, the legislature was able to significantly limit the scope
of remedies previously available under the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.24
B. The Section 912(1) Preemption Provision
Section 912(1) of the WDFEA preemption provision provides
that the WDFEA will not apply when a discharge is subject to
any state or federal statute that provides a procedure or remedy

19. Id.
20.
Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg., 212 Mont. 274, 282, 687 P.2d 1015,
1020 (1984).
21.
Schramm, supra note 1, at 95.
22.
Schramm, supra note 1, at 95.
23.
Schramm, supra note 1, at 108; Legislative Intent, supra note 1.
24.
Schramm, supra note 1, at 95.
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for contesting the dispute." The WDFEA was designed to give
statutory protection to those wrongfully discharged employees
who otherwise would not have protection under a contract or
other statutory scheme.2 6 The legislature did not intend to provide a discharged employee with a WDFEA cause of action when
the employee had a remedy under another federal or state statute.27 Similarly, the WDFEA will not apply when a discharged
employee is covered by a collective bargaining agreement or a
written contract for a specific term.2" Thus, in addition to limiting the amount recoverable for a wrongful discharge, the legislature also limited the scope of persons protected by the WDFEA.
Despite the language of the preemption provision, in 1991,
two federal district courts in Vance v. ANR Freight Systems,
Inc.2' and Higgins v. Food Services of America, Inc.,3 held that
when the facts of a discrimination claim were separate and distinct from those of a wrongful discharge claim, the WDFEA preemption provision would not apply. Thus, under Vance and
Higgins, discharged employees were not foreclosed from pursuing
a remedy under both a federal discrimination statute and the
WDFEA.3 ' However, two years later in Tonack v. Montana
Bank, the Montana Supreme Court declined to follow Vance and
Higgins and held that the section 912(1) preemption provision
prevented the plaintiff from maintaining a concurrent age discrimination and wrongful discharge claim.3 2 The holding in
Tonack resumed a course true to the language of the section
912(1) preemption provision, and demonstrated the WDFEA's
impact upon wrongfully discharged older employees.

25. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912(1) (1993).
26. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912(1)-(2) (1993).
27. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912 (1993); see also Meech v. Hillhaven W.,
Inc., 238 Mont. 21, 776 P.2d 488 (1989). The court in Meech stated:
The Act exempts from its provisions causes of action for discharge governed
by other state or federal statutory procedures for contesting discharge disputes. For example, the Act exempts from its provisions, discriminatory discharges, and actions for wrongful discharge from employment covered by
written collective bargaining agreements or controlled by a written contract
for a specific term.
Id. at 25, 776 P.2d at 490.
28. See Irving v. Sch. Dist. No. 1-1A, 248 Mont. 460, 813 P.2d 417 (1991); Fellows v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 244 Mont. 7, 795 P.2d 484 (1990).
9 Mont. Fed. Rpts. 36 (D. Mont. 1991).
29.
30.
9 Mont. Fed. Rpts. 529 (D. Mont. 1991).
31. See Vance, 9 Mont. Fed. Rpts. at 39-40; Higgins, 9 Mont. Fed. Rpts. at 530.
32.
Tonack, 258 Mont. at 254-55, 854 P.2d at 331.
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III. TONACK V. MONTANA BANK
A. The Facts
The Montana Bank of Sidney hired Betty Tonack (Tonack)
as a bank teller in 1981." The Sidney bank promoted Tonack to
teller supervisor' and, in 1988, Tonack learned of an opening
with an affiliated bank in Billings-the Montana Bank of Billings (Bank)."5 The Bank interviewed Tonack and offered her the
position of Financial Services Representative (FSR).5 Tonack
accepted the position with the Bank as FSR,37 moved to Billings, and began work in October of 1988.38
In January 1990, Tonack's supervisors evaluated Tonack's
performance as FSR "as fully satisfactory [and] 'more toward the
excellent side.'"39 Due to Tonack's favorable evaluation for her
performance as FSR, the Bank gave her a pay raise and the
additional responsibilities of "Customer Service Representative"
and "Teller Supervisor" (CSR/Teller Supervisor). °
On May 1, 1990, Lynette Kiedrowski became president of
the Bank and Tonack's direct supervisor.4 ' Ten days later,
Kiedrowski evaluated Tonack's performance and concluded that
Tonack was an "Employee Progressing at Standard."42 Soon
however, a series of events compromised Tonack's assent at the
Bank' and eventually lead to her termination. Tonack's trou33. Id. at 250, 854 P.2d at 328.
34. Id.
35. Respondent's Brief at 5, Tonack v. Montana Bank, 258 Mont. 247, 854 P.2d
326 (1993) (No. 92-343).
36. Id.
37. In district court, Judge Filner concluded that "Tonack was given a job description for her position as FSR which specifically set forth her duties and responsibilities, as well as the performance expectations of Defendant Bank." Tonack v. Montana Bank, No. DV 91-070, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (June 3, 1992),
Finding of Fact No. 7, at 3 [hereinafter Findings of Fact].
38. Tonack, 258 Mont. at 250, 854 P.2d at 326.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 250, 854 P.2d at 328. See also Findings of Fact, supra note 37,
No. 10, at 4. Incidentally, the Bank did not give Tonack "a job description outlining
her new job duties and responsibilities or the performance expectations of the Defendant Bank (as was done when Tonack began her job in 1988 as FSR)." Findings
of Fact, supra note 37, No. 10, at 4.
41. Tonack, 258 Mont. at 250, 854 P.2d at 328; see also Findings of Fact, supra
note 37, No. 16, at 6.
42. Findings of Fact, supra note 37, No. 17, at 6.
43. During Kiedrowski's review of Tonack on May 10, 1990, Kiedrowski noted:
"[Tonack's] next opportunity is to Financial Services Executive. Once CSR and FSR
are consistently at satisfactory levels that option can be explored." Respondent's Brief
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bles began in August of 1990 when the Bank conducted an internal audit and discovered two discrepancies: Someone within the
Bank had embezzled five hundred dollars in travelers checks and
improperly issued a certificate of deposit without obtaining payment from the customer." Despite the fact that Tonack was not
responsible for auditing travelers checks and was away on vacation when the thefts occurred,' Kiedrowski blamed Tonack for
the discrepancies." As a result, Kiedrowski, in violation of the
Bank's written personnel policies, placed Tonack on thirty days
probation and stripped Tonack of all her duties except those of
FSR.47
During Tonack's probationary period, Kiedrowski instructed
Tonack to cross-train Rhonda Kreamer, a substantially younger
Bank employee, as a "backup" FSR." Tonack discovered that
the Bank had ordered business cards bearing the name Rhonda
Kreamer with the title of FSR, despite the fact that the Bank
only had one FSR position-that occupied by Tonack. 4' During

at 8, Tonack (No. 92-343).
44. Appellant's Brief at 5, Tonack v. Montana Bank, 258 Mont. 247, 854 P.2d
326 (1994) (No. 92-343).
45. Judge Filner found that the "defalcation" discovered during the audit was
not Tonack's fault because of the lack of an "approved job description" that would
sufficiently hold a CSR/Teller Supervisor responsible for deficiencies in the "Travelers
Check area." Findings of Fact, supra note 37, No. 22, at 7-8. The position of
CSR/Teller Supervisor had not existed for an extended period of time before Tonack
was given the position. Findings of Fact, supra note 37, No. 12, at 4-5. After the
Bank gave Tonack the job, Kiedrowski requested Tonack to draft her own job description. Tonack drafted the job description (which excluded auditing responsibilities
in general and in the traveler checks area) and delivered it to Kiedrowski;
Kiedrowski apparently did not find any deficiencies with the job description because
she indicated no intent to alter the document as drafted by Tonack. See Findings of
Fact, supra note 37, No. 19, at 6-7.
46. The Bank maintained that the discrepancies occurred in areas under the supervision of Tonack and "the embezzlement was made possible because tellers supervised by Tonack did not keep an accurate inventory of travelers checks." Appellant's
Brief at 5, Tonack (No. 92-343). However, the district court found that the discrepancy was not Tonack's responsibility because of the absence of a job description for
CSR/Teller Supervisor and the fact that the Bank had specifically retained auditing
responsibilities in the operations department of the Bank. Findings of Fact, supra
note 37, No. 22, at 7-8.
47. Tonack, 258 P.2d at 250, 854 P.2d at 328. The Bank's written personnel
manual explicitly stated: "[p]robation is usually for a period of [90] days and the employee should be carefully observed for improvement during this period." Findings of
Fact, supra note 37, No. 23, at 8. During Tonack's 30 day probationary period, an
employee in the operations area of the Bank confessed to the "theft" of the travelers
checks, and yet, Tonack still remained on probation. Findings of Fact, supra note 37,
No. 25, at 8-9.
48. Tonack, 258 Mont. at 251, 854 P.2d at 328.
49. Id.
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the week Tonack was supposed to cross-train Kreamer, the individual who was scheduled to replace Kreamer during the training failed to show up for work.5" Kiedrowski was out of town for
the week and, because the replacement had not shown up,
Tonack decided to postpone the cross-training of Kreamer.51
Kiedrowski returned from vacation and promptly fired Tonack
"as a result of her failure to correct deficiencies in the CSR/Teller
Supervision area and her inability to work with others."" At
the time of her termination, Tonack was forty-nine years old and
had worked for the Bank for almost ten years.53
B. Procedure & Holding
Tonack filed a wrongful discharge action against the Bank
under the WDFEA. Shortly after filing the complaint in district
court, Tonack's counsel contacted Gary Nichols, Tonack's supervisor before Kiedrowski and vice president of the Bank. Tonack's
counsel discovered age discrimination to be the underlying reason for Tonack's termination.' Nichols told Tonack's counsel
that George Balback, president of the holding company for the
Bank, "wanted Ms. Tonack terminated because of her age and
background."55 Balback expressed discontent that the former
and current presidents of the bank could not manage to terminate Tonack,
but was confident Kiedrowski could "get it han56
dled."

As a result of Nichols' information, Tonack filed an age discrimination claim with the Montana Human Rights Commission
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. She also
amended her district court action to include violations under the
ADEA.5" At trial, the court found that the Bank violated both
the ADEA and the WDFEA in terminating Tonack.5" The court
awarded Tonack four years of future lost wages and benefits-the maximum allowed under the WDFEA-and also awarded damages under the ADEA (calculated from the last date of

50. Id. at 251, 854 P.2d at 329.
51. Id.
52. Findings of Fact, supra note 37, No. 29, at 10; see also Tonack, 258 Mont.
at 251, 854 P.2d at 329.
53. Tonack, 258 Mont. at 250-51, 854 P.2d at 328-29.
54. Respondent's Brief at 14, Tonack (No. 92-342).
55. Findings of Fact, supra note 37, No. 14, at 5.
56. Tonack, 258 Mont. at 252, 854 P.2d at 329-30.
57. Respondent's Brief at 15-16, Tonack (No. 92-343).
58. Tonack, 258 Mont. at 251, 854 P.2d at 329.
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damages under the WDFEA until Tonack's expected date of
retirement).59
On appeal, the Bank claimed that the district court incorrectly interpreted or misapplied the provisions of the WDFEA.60
The Bank contended that the WDFEA preemption provision
prevented Tonack from pursuing both the ADEA and WDFEA
claim. The Montana Supreme Court, with one dissent,6 agreed
with the Bank and held that the WDFEA preemption provision
precluded Tonack from recovering damages under the
WDFEA.62
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Tonack & Concurrent Claims Under the WDFEA
The issues raised by Tonack's complaint created a quandary
for the Montana Supreme Court. On one hand, the district court
found that Tonack's employer violated the WDFEA by breaching
its personnel policies and terminating Tonack without good
cause. 63 On the other hand, the district court concluded that
Tonack's employer also engaged in age discrimination.6 4 However, despite the discharge without good cause and the importance
of the personnel policy provision of the WDFEA,"5 the preemp-

59. Id.
60. Id. at 250, 854 P.2d at 328.
61. Justice Trieweiler agreed with the holdings in Vance and Higgins, arguing
that the preemption provision should not apply to Tonack because she alleged
"separate and independent reasons why her termination from employment was unlawful." Id. at 256, 854 P.2d at 332 (Trieweiler, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Trieweiler also argued that the preemption provision should not
apply because no other statute provided a remedy for Tonack's written personnel
policy claim. Id.
62. Tonack, 258 Mont. at 254-55, 854 P.2d at 331.
63. The Bank violated its written personnel policy by failing to give Tonack a
warning prior to being on placed on probation; furthermore, the written policy stated
that the usual probationary period was 90 days. Kiedrowski placed Tonack on a 30
day probationary period. Findings of Fact, supra note 37, No. 23, at 8. The Bank
terminated Tonack without good cause by failing to provide evidence of Tonack's
deficient performance. Findings of Fact, supra note 37, No. 36, at 11.
64. Findings of Fact, supra note 37, No. 38, at 12.
65. See supra part II.A. Two recent decisions by the Montana Supreme Court
illustrate the importance of the written personnel policy provision of the WDFEA:
Miller v. Citizens State Bank, 252 Mont. 472, 830 P.2d 550 (1992), and Kearney v.
KXLF Communications, Inc., 263 Mont. 407, 869 P.2d 772 (1994). In Kearney (decided after Tonack), the court held that an express written personnel policy may exist
despite its absence from an employee handbook. In Kearney, the plaintiff argued that
his employer's express written personnel policy existed in the form of pre-printed
evaluation forms used to evaluate all employees and a memo from a supervisor stat-
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tion provision prevented Tonack from maintaining concurrent
claims under the ADEA and WDFEA. 5
The Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court's
award to Tonack under both the ADEA and WDFEA and outlined the following procedure to be utilized when a plaintiff files
concurrent claims under the WDFEA and another state or federal statute:
Whether a discharge will ultimately be "subject to any other
state or federal statute that provides a procedure or remedy for
contesting the dispute" is not immediately known when a claim
is filed. This must be determined before it is known whether
the Wrongful Discharge Act may be applied. It is established
only when a finder of fact has made that determination or
when judgment on the claim has otherwise been entered.
Therefore, we conclude that claims may be filed concurrently
under the Wrongful Discharge Act... but if an affirmative

ing that "[e]ach person should get an evaluation of their performance at least one
time per year." 263 Mont. at 418, 869 P.2d at 778. By allowing express written personnel policies to exist in forms other than the employer's handbook, the Kearney
court seems to be broadly interpreting the scope of the written personnel policy provision. This broad interpretation of the provision is consistent with prior Montana
Supreme Court decisions on the issue. See, e.g., Buck v. Billings Mont. Chevrolet,
Inc., 248 Mont. 276, 284-85, 811 P.2d 537, 542 (1991) (holding that a termination in
light of a written personnel policy that "assured [the plaintiffs] continued employment if his job performance and economic circumstances remained satisfactory" may
be actionable when the plaintiff continued to produce for his financially stable employer); see also Bierman & Youngblood, supra note 2, at 71-73 ("The Montana Supreme Court in Buck appears to be giving a fairly wide range of latitude to the
language contained in section 904(3) of the WDFEA.").
In Miller, the plaintiff sued under the WDFEA, alleging her employer terminated her without "good cause" and in violation of its written personnel policies. The
plaintiff alleged that her employer violated its personnel policies by failing to provide
her with a "formal" warning that "her continued substandard performance would
result in dismissal." Miller, 252 Mont. at 475, 830 P.2d at 552. In a rather brief
opinion, the Montana Supreme Court held that in addition to an unfavorable written
evaluation, the employer warned the plaintiff on at least three occasions that her
poor performance would result in termination. Id. at 475, 830 P.2d at 551-52. The
court held that the plaintiff was unable to prove a wrongful discharge because the
employer carefully followed its own written personnel policies. Id. at 475, 830 P.2d at
552. The court did not, however, state whether an unwritten oral warning would
constitute a "formal" warning consistent with the employer's written personnel policies. The decision in Miller nonetheless demonstrates the court's dedication to the
legislative and historical directive to encourage employers to follow their own express
written personnel policies. Therefore, as demonstrated by Kearney and Miller, the
Montana Supreme Court broadly determines what constitutes an employer's express
written personnel policies; however, once it finds those policies, the court-consistent
with the legislative intent and pre-WDFEA case law-is stringently holding both the
employer and the employee to the terms of those policies.
66.
Tonack, 258 Mont. at 254-55, 854 P.2d at 331.
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determination of the claim is obtained under such other statutes, the Wrongful Discharge Act may no longer be applied.67
B. Modification of Deeds v. Decker Coal Co.
The Tonack court held that since the district court made the
factual determination that the ADEA "applied" to Tonack's discharge, Tonack was not able to recover under the WDFEA.6"
The court departed from its previous interpretation of the preemption provision in Deeds v. Decker Coal Co. 9
In Deeds, the Montana Supreme Court held that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a federal statute, did not preempt the WDFEA because the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) had not yet filed a formal complaint under the NLRA.70
In Deeds, employees working for the Decker Coal Company
(Decker) went on strike after their collective bargaining
agreement had expired.7 1 Decker allowed 80 employees to return to work, but discharged the remaining 152 due to allegations of "serious strike misconduct."7 2 As a result, the discharged employees filed unfair labor charges with the NLRB,
alleging that they were terminated in retaliation for protected
union activities.7 3
The discharged employees then filed a claim under the
WDFEA. The district court granted Decker's motion for summary
judgment, holding that the preemption provision of the WDFEA
preempted the plaintiffs state claim.7 4 The Montana Supreme
Court reversed, holding "[sihould the NLRB eventually decide to
enter into the dispute by filing a complaint on behalf of the discharged employees, a 'procedure or remedy for contesting the
dispute' would be set in motion, and the statutory [preemption
provision] would apply."75 Thus, if the NLRB had filed a formal

67. Id. at 255, 854 P.2d at 331.
68. Id.; see Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 238 Mont. 21, 25, 776 P.2d 488, 490
(1989) (stating that the WDFEA "exempts from its provisions causes of actions
for . . .discriminatory discharges").

69. 246 Mont. 220, 805 P.2d 1270 (1990). The court in Tonack stated: "To the
extent that this conclusion modifies our holding in Deeds, that opinion is so modified." Tonack, 258 Mont. at 255, 854 P.2d at 331.
70. Deeds, 246 Mont. at 223, 805 P.2d at 1271-72.
71. Id. at 222, 805 P.2d at 1271.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 222, 805 P.2d at 1271.
75. Deeds, 246 Mont. at 223, 805 P.2d at 1271.
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complaint on behalf of the employees, the federal law would have
preempted the WDFEA claim. However, since the NLRB had not
filed a formal complaint, the Deeds court determined that, in
order to ensure the plaintiffs a forum, proceedings had to be
stayed at the district court level pending NLRB action.
The readily distinguishable facts of the two cases raise questions as to how Tonack actually modified Deeds. Deeds involved
potential conflicting statutes: the plaintiffs filed a wrongful discharge claim while the NLRB investigated the unfair labor practices charge.7" In Tonack, however, the plaintiff filed two actions-one federal, one state-which, although allegedly distinct
in nature, related to the same discharge.77 The Tonack decision
suggests that a court78 will be charged with the responsibility of
determining whether another state or federal statute applies
(and thus whether that statute preempts the WDFEA) only when
a plaintiff files concurrent claims under the WDFEA and another
state or federal statute.79 The holding in Deeds complicates the
issues and permits alternative conclusions based on two
plausible interpretations of Tonack.
Under the first interpretation of Tonack, a court would ignore the number of formal claims filed; it would apply the literal
language of Tonack by factually determining in every WDFEA
claim if the discharge is subject to any other state or federal
statute providing a remedy or procedure for contesting the dispute. The WDFEA would no longer apply if a wrongfully discharged employee filed only a WDFEA claim, but a court nonetheless determined that the discharge applied to another state or
federal statute. Therefore, if the holding in Tonack was applied
76. Id. at 222, 805 P.2d at 1271.
77. Tonack, 258 P.2d at 247, 854 P.2d at 331.
78. The use of the word "court" in this context means the finder of fact or the
trial judge. The Tonack court held that a plaintiff will be entitled to a WDFEA remedy "only when a finder of fact has made that determination or when judgement on
the claim has otherwise been entered." Id. at 255, 854 P.2d at 331. Thus, the court
seems to be inviting motions for summary judgment and jury instructions to determine whether the WDFEA will apply when a plaintiff files concurrent claims.
79. This conclusion is supported by the facts of Tonack and the language of the
decision: "[The court] conclude[s] that claims may be filed concurrently under the
Wrongful Discharge Act and other state or federal statutes described in § 39-2-912,
MCA, but if an affirmative determination of the claim is obtained under such other
statutes, the Wrongful Discharge Act may no longer be applied." Tonack, 258 Mont.
at 255, 854 P.2d at 331 (emphasis added). The court's use of the word "may" is troubling. By definition, "may" means permissive, although the court does not seem to be
permitting a choice when another statute applies to the WDFEA. Certainly, the ultimate holding in Tonack or the plain language of the § 912(1) preemption provision

does not suggest a choice.
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to the factual situation in Deeds, the result in Deeds would be
different, the NLRA would preempt the state wrongful discharge
claim, and the plaintiffs would not be guaranteed a forum.
Under the second interpretation, Tonack would modify
Deeds, the result in Deeds would not change, and the plaintiffs
would still be guaranteed a forum. A court utilizing this interpretation would determine if another state or federal statute
applied to the discharge only when a plaintiff filed concurrent
claims under the WDFEA and another state or federal statute."
Then, if a court determined that the federal or state statute applied to the plaintiffs discharge, the WDFEA claim would be
preempted.
The facts of Tonack illustrate why the second interpretation
is the more logical of the two. If Nichols, the former vice president of the Bank, had not told Tonack's attorney that the Bank's
termination of Tonack was based on considerations of age,
Tonack would never have filed an ADEA claim. If Tonack had no
knowledge that her termination was age-motivated, her ADEA
claim would exist only in theory. However, under the first interpretation, the Bank could assert that the ADEA preempted
Tonack's WDFEA claim, even if she did not file an ADEA claim.
Certainly, the drafters of the WDFEA did not envision such a
narrow interpretation of the preemption provision.8
The second interpretation would modify Deeds only to the
extent that Tonack established a procedure to be followed when
a plaintiff files concurrent claims under the WDFEA and another
state or federal statute. If the Montana Supreme Court applied
the second interpretation of Tonack to the factual situation in
Deeds, the result in Deeds would not change and the proceedings
would be stayed at the district court level pending NLRB action.
Future Interpretation of the Preemption Provision

80. See supra text accompanying note 67.
81. If, however, the wrongfully discharged employee's complaint clearly suggests
that the proper remedy was under another state or federal statute, then the WDFEA
would no longer apply. See, e.g., Harrison v. Chance, 244 Mont. 215, 797 P.2d 200
(1990). In Harrison, after the plaintiffs employer made several unwanted sexual
advances and demanded that the plaintiff either "put out or get out," the plaintiff
resigned and filed a claim alleging tortious battery, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, wrongful discharge, the tort of outrage, and breach of the implied covenant

of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 218, 223, 797 P.2d at 202, 205. The defendant
employer asserted that the plaintiffs proper remedy was the Human Rights Act,
which provided the exclusive remedy for sexual harassment. Id. at 219, 797 P.2d at
202. The Montana Supreme Court agreed, holding that since the plaintiffs tort theories were "based" upon and "ar[olse" from sexual harassment, her tort claims were
preempted by the Human Rights Act. Id. at 223, 797 P.2d at 205.
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Arguments over the two interpretations of Tonack may be
less important than how the Montana Supreme Court will interpret the preemption provision in the future. Since the facts before the Tonack court involved concurrent claims-and not the
dilemma raised in Deeds-the proper question may be how the
court will interpret the preemption provision when plaintiffs file
concurrent claims. The holding in Tonack will make it extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for wrongful discharge claimants to
maintain concurrent WDFEA and discrimination claims.
The Tonack court declined to "completely follow" the decisions in Vance v. ANR Freight Systems, Inc.8 2 and Higgins v.
Food Services of America, Inc.," holding that Tonack's wrongful
discharge and age discrimination claims "relate[d] to one discharge from employment at the bank."' The court held that the
ADEA preempted Tonack's wrongful discharge claim because the
district court found that the ADEA "applied" to Tonack's discharge from employment.85 Apparently, the Montana Supreme
Court presumed that because the district court found that the
Bank had a discriminatory motive for discharging Tonack, the
ADEA "applied" to Tonack's discharge." Thus, the court suggests that any time a trial court determines that an employer
had a discriminatory motive for discharging an employee, the
discrimination statute will "apply." As a result, Tonack will
make it very difficult for future wrongful discharge claimants to
establish a separate and distinct factual predicate for a wrongful
discharge and discrimination claim. In other words, wrongful
discharge claimants will likely be unable to successfully make
future Vance and Higgins arguments.
The Montana Supreme Court's refusal to follow Vance and
Higgins is consistent with the legislature's attempt to provide
discharged employees with only one statutory remedy.8 7 Moreover, the court's holding may have the practical effect of compelling wrongful discharge claimants to choose between the WDFEA
and the applicable discrimination statute when faced with multiple claims. Those claimants who do choose to file concurrent
claims under the WDFEA and another state or federal statute
risk losing their WDFEA claim. Consequently, if a wrongfully

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

9 Mont. Fed. Rpts. 36 (D. Mont. 1991).
9 Mont. Fed. Rpts. 529 (D. Mont. 1991).
See Tonack, 258 Mont. at 254, 854 P.2d at 331.
Id. at 255, 854 P.2d at 330.
See Findings of Fact, supra note 37, Nos. 37-38, at 12.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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discharged employee does choose to pursue only a WDFEA
claim,88 the employee will be able only to recover four years of
lost wages and fringe benefits-a limitation particularly significant for the wrongfully discharged older employee. 9
V.

WRONGFULLY DISCHARGED OLDER EMPLOYEES AND THE

FOUR-YEAR DAMAGE LIMITATION
The drafters of the WDFEA recognized that the four-year
damage limitation might be insufficient for wrongfully discharged older employees and attempted to exempt them from the
limitation.9" The legislature adopted the exemption in the Committee of the Whole but killed it late in the amendment process
in Conference Committee.9 The failure of the legislature to exempt wrongfully discharged employees from the four-year damage limitation illustrates that the legislature disregarded the fact
that, for wrongfully discharged older employees, the WDFEA
does not represent a reasonable compromise between the competing interests of the employer and employee.92
The four-year damage limitation within the WDFEA seems
logical when applied to most employees, but the limitation does
not properly account for the significant barriers faced by older
workers in the job market. When the drafters of the WDFEA
created the four-year limitation for lost wages and fringe benefits, they rationalized that the limitation was a "reasonable period of time for a discharged employee to become resituated in the
labor market."9 3 The legislature further stated that the fouryear limitation "will act as an incentive for a discharged employee to find alternate employment that puts the employee's talents

88. A wrongfully discharged older employee may choose not to sue under a
discrimination statute because the employee may not be aware of or have sufficient
evidence to pursue such claim. Recall that Tonack did not know of her ADEA claim
until after she filed her WDFEA claim when the former vice-president of the Bank
told her she was terminated because of her age.
89. See discussion infra part V.
90. See infra pp. 16-17 and note 103.
91. See Committee of the Whole Amend., 50th Mont. Leg. (Mar. 27, 1987); Conference Committee Report, 50th Mont. Leg. (Mar. 20, 1987).
92. See Legislative Intent, supra note 1; see also Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc.,
238 Mont. 21, 50, 776 P.2d 488, 506 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the
WDFEA, and holding that classifications created by WDFEA are rationally related to
a legitimate state interest because the statute creates greater certainty to both employers and employees and "provide[s] 'a reasonably just substitute for the common
law causes it abrogate[s]').
93. Legislative Intent, supra note 1.
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to best use."9 4 The reasoning used to support the limitation
makes sense for most younger discharged employees who are
able to re-train and find other employment; however, the same
reasoning is not persuasive when applied to older workers simply because older workers, once unemployed, remain unemployed
longer than any other age group. 5 Furthermore, wrongfully discharged older employees generally have very little time to become "resituated in the labor market."
Older workers are unable to re-enter the work-force as
quickly as younger workers; they are often unprepared for personnel interviews, employment tests, and competition with younger workers. 6 Additionally, older individuals are often unable
to work at a pay level equal to that of their former employment. 7 "Once out of work, [the] older worker will confront
greater difficulties than younger counterparts in finding new
employment." ' In a recent congressional hearing entitled "Age
Discrimination in the Workplace: A Continuing Problem for
Older Workers," Congress found that despite the ADEA, employers still turn away older workers in favor of younger workers due
to incorrect assumptions about age and job performance.99
During legislative consideration of the WDFEA, an ad hoc
committee, comprised of attorneys who practiced in employment
termination law,"° recognized the potential inadequacy of the
four-year damage limitation as applied to wrongfully discharged
older employees. The committee proposed an amendment to the
statute that excluded from the damage limitation persons within
the protected age class"' who had been employed for ten or
more years with their employer." 2 The committee gave the following rationale for the exclusion:
This amendment, while recognizing the [four year] limitation
94. Legislative Intent, supra note 1.
95. Age Discrimination in the Workplace: A Continuing Problem for Older Workers: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1991) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of The Honorable William J. Hughes).
96. ANDREW W. RuzICHO & LOUIS A. JACOBS, LITIGATING AGE DISCRIMINATION
CASES 41 (1991).
97. RuzICHO & JACOBS, supra note 96, at 41; Hearing, supra note 95, at 66-70.
98. Hearing, supra note 95, at 69.
99. Hearing, supra note 95, at 68.
100. Proposed Amends. to H.B. 241, Senate Judiciary Comm., Proposed Amend.
No. 8, First Reading, 50th Mont. Leg. (Mar. 10, 1987).
101. The ADEA sets the protected age class at 40. 29 U.S.C § 631 (Supp. IV
1992).
102. Proposed Amends. to H.B. 241, Senate Judiciary Comm., Proposed Amend.
No. 8, First Reading, 50th Mont. Leg. (Mar. 10, 1987).
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on back-pay for younger employees who have better ability to
become re-employed following a wrongful discharge, allows for
recognition of employees who are [forty] years or more of age
and who have been employed for more than [ten] years. The
example situation is an employee [fifty-seven] years of age who
has worked for the employer for [thirty] years. An employee
who has reached that age, and has limited his employment to
the specialized needs of his employer, should be allowed to
show that is unlikely that he can become re-employed at age
[fifty-seven] in a similar job, if that is the evidence presented.
The amendment would still allow the jury to consider whether
that is a legitimate claim, and to offset other earnings. However, the legislation as written is patently unfair to older and
more vulnerable employees who frequently are unable to reenter the job force on the pay level previously earned. They
should at least have the opportunity to present a legitimate
claim for economic losses that extend beyond the [three]-year
period.' O3
The Committee of the Whole adopted the exemption for older
employees but, without explanation in the legislative history,
killed it in Conference Committee.' °4 One possible reason the
Conference Committee killed the amendment is the same reason
employers, insurance companies, and legislators desired the
WDFEA in the first place: to eliminate high damage awards and
marginal wrongful discharge claims.0 5 In the eyes of the insurance companies and employers who sought statutory protection
from increasing wrongful discharge actions and large monetary
awards, the older person amendment was merely a back door to
the undesired and unpredictable status of the Montana employment discharge climate that existed prior to enactment of the
WDFEA.' ° Nevertheless, by refusing to adopt the older
person amendment, the legislature did not follow its own legislative commitment to balance the competing interests of the employer and the discharged employee. The legislature ultimately
chose to disregard the fact that older workers face greater difficulties in finding new employment than younger workers.0 7 To

103.
Rationale of Proposed Amends. to H.B. 241, Senate Judiciary Comm., Proposed Amend. No. 8, First Reading, 50th Mont. Leg. (Mar. 10, 1987).
104. The legislative history does not reveal what compelled the legislature to
adopt the amendment so late in the process and what compelled the Conference
Committee to kill the amendment.
105.
See supra part II.A.
106. See supra part II.A
107.
See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1995

17

602

Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 10

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

remedy the situation, the Montana Legislature should do as the
ad hoc committee recommended and pass legislation relieving
wrongfully discharged older employees from the four-year damage limitation of the WDFEA.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Montana Supreme Court's holding in Tonack v. Montana Bank raises questions of exactly how the court modified
Deeds and how the preemption provision might be interpreted in
the future. The court should adopt the second interpretation of
Tonack and determine that the section 912(1) preemption provision applies only when a wrongfully discharged employee files
concurrent claims under the WDFEA and another state or federal statute.
The potentially adverse impact the WDFEA damage limitation has upon wrongfully discharged older employees was first
recognized by the drafters of the WDFEA and was recently illuminated by the Tonack court's refusal to follow the reasoning in
Vance and Higgins. If the WDFEA is truly a balancing of interests, as it has been suggested to be, then the Montana Legislature should, as a matter of public policy, enact legislation that
recognizes the unique difficulties faced by wrongfully discharged
older employees in the labor market.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/10

18

